AUDIE CORNISH, HOST:
One week after the Charlie Hebdo attack in France in which 12 people were killed, al-Qaida's branch in Yemen is claiming responsibility. A statement by the group, also known as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, says the satirical magazine was specifically chosen as a target and the gunmen were, quote, "two heroes of Islam." The group also released a YouTube video asserting the claim. In a moment, we'll hear from the French ambassador to the U.S. But first, some analysis on this claim from Bruce Hoffman. He directs Georgetown's Center for Security Studies. Thank you for joining us.
BRUCE HOFFMAN: You're welcome.
CORNISH: So the State Department now says that the video released by AQAP is authentic. But that - does that necessarily mean that they were fully responsible for the attack? And by that we mean, like, order, plan, finance.
HOFFMAN: I suppose welcome to the new form of terrorism. This may not have had the direct pedigree in that they actually issued specific targeted instructions at a particular time in a particular place, but rather provided the Kouachi brothers with more general instructions. And that is not at all uncommon in al-Qaida operations, even going back a decade and a half ago.
CORNISH: So what are the implications of all this?
HOFFMAN: That's quite significant because when a terrorist group claims credit for an attack, it has a much more salient, now organizational dimension, which suggests something that is not a one-off, but that is part of a wider strategic campaign.
CORNISH: You mentioned Cherif and Said Kouachi and their connection to AQAP. But does that connection necessarily mean that they were led directly by the group?
HOFFMAN: Well, at least in the case of Said Kouachi, it's almost certainly true that he was trained by the group at one point. I mean, it may have been three or four years ago. This conforms, actually, I have to say, to an old pattern of al-Qaida in many respects in that they train individuals, they send them back to their actual homelands or adopted homes, they leave them in place and then they completely devolve authority to them to plan, plot and implement a terrorist attack. And that, to me, seems to be the most plausible explanation for the chain of events that led to the tragedy last week at the Charlie Hebdo offices.
CORNISH: Meanwhile, the gunmen in the attack at the kosher market in Paris that came after the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices, those attacks were claimed to be in the name of ISIS. What do you make of that?
HOFFMAN: First and foremost, it underscores what is probably the biggest rivalry in the globe today, and that's the rivalry between ISIS and al-Qaida for leadership of the jihadi movement. Secondly, I think it shows that for the foot soldiers on the ground, the ideology is the same, which I think is true. There's really not that much difference between ISIS and al-Qaida. It's more the personality differences and rivalries between the leader of ISIS - al-Baghdadi - and Bin Laden's successor, the leader of al-Qaida - al-Zawahiri .
CORNISH: Does this change at all the way we think about how al-Qaida's tactics may be changing?
HOFFMAN: Yes, and I think that's particularly disquieting. At the end of the day, the coin of a realm for a terrorist group is attacking, and success. Otherwise, they generate no favorable propaganda - or at least propaganda they can harness in their favor - they can't attract recruits and they can't get money. So I think AQAP - al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula - was desperate for a successful terrorist operation and therefore, I think, devolved onto a much simpler type of attack that wasn't even a suicide attack, but something involving firearms and something that was relatively easy for people that are disciplined and trained, such as the Kouachi brothers, to pull off.
CORNISH: Given what you've described, what are the options for security? What are the questions here about how to defend against this kind of discrete, lone attack?
HOFFMAN: We're really facing a threat now. And I hate to sort of sound alarmist, but of almost an unprecedented dimension in the sense that in the past we could track individual terrorists. In the past, we could - we were challenged and we could focus on foreign fighters. And I believe that's where much of the emphasis of intelligence and security and law enforcement services throughout Europe - and even in the United States - has been on tracking individuals leaving a country to fight overseas, particularly in Syria or in Iraq, and then the fear of them returning. On top of that now, they have to contend with this very significant homegrown threat of individuals who basically remain in place or have remained in place for some years following a period of training. And for law enforcement, security and intelligence services that have already been strained by the threat of foreign fighters and, let's say, the more professional terrorists This is now an added dimension that they have to pay attention to. And it's something, I think, that has the potential really to strain already constrained or reduced resources, as in recent years, we've seen the War On Terrorism - or at least we had hoped it was winding down.
CORNISH: Bruce Hoffman is director of Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies. His new book out next month is called "Anonymous Soldiers." Bruce Hoffman, thanks so much for speaking with us.
HOFFMAN: You're very welcome.